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European Parliament elections in May 2019 come at a critical time in the evolution of the EU 
as these will be the first elections after the expected departure of the UK (March 2019) and at 
a time when divergence on many issues characterises member state relations. Wider global 
developments weigh heavily on Europe with the return of hard geopolitics and efforts to 
undermine the global multilateral order. The European University Institute (EUI) wants to 
highlight the major issues that are at the heart of the political agenda at this juncture as a 
contribution to the debate. The papers are part of a wider programme on the elections 
including the development of a Voting Advice Application (VAA), euandi2019, and an 
online tool specifically tailored for mobile EU citizens voting either in their country of 
citizenship or residence, spaceu2019.
This initiative on the European Parliament elections in 2019 is part of the Schuman Centre’s 
European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP) egpp.eui.eu. Launched in 2018, the 
Programme aims to foster high-quality academic research and reflection on the European 
Union and European integration with a medium to long-term perspective. The EGPP also 
promotes engagement on contemporary issues through various events, including blog 
debates and thematic conferences and workshops.
  
Abstract 
This paper focuses on three legacies of the euro crisis that still need to be properly addressed in order to 
prevent new crises, gain resilience and grow: the euro area divide legacy, the debt legacy and the fiscal 
time-inconsistency legacy (i.e. fiscal policies are not sufficiently counter-cyclical). First, it argues in 
favour of implementing ‘experience-rated policies,’ which can benefit all without incurring undesired 
transfers; examples are the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) and the European 
Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS). Second, it argues in favour of strengthening the fiscal 
institutional framework of the EMU by broadening the scope of the European Stability Mechanism so 
as to make it a proper European Stability Fund, which, in addition to transforming current contracts into 
more efficient ESF contracts, should be able to: host the central funds of the EDIS and EUIS; provide 
risk-sharing among the participating countries; transform part of the legacy sovereign debt into safe ESF 
contracts; and, as a result of its larger scope and its ‘constrained-efficient contracts,’ be in a position to 
issue ‘safe’ eurobonds.  
Keywords 
Institutional design, experience-rated policies, risk-sharing, sovereign-debt, credible fiscal policies. 
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The central question European citizens face in the May 2019 election to the European Parliament is: 
what do you want the European Union to be after Brexit and the euro crisis, and in the current 
international realignment in which the EU is losing ground? This does not mean that electoral debates 
will focus on this question, or that voters will take an explicit position on it with their vote. But in 
practice they will do so, even if their vote, or abstention, will be mostly determined by their position on 
national politics and, possibly more than in the past, their position in a fairly ideological debate over a 
range of options: a nationalistic-populist Europe, a green Europe, more (federal and/or social) Europe, 
and let’s protect the Europe we have (or we had with Maastricht). Unfortunately, neither domestic 
politics nor the ideological debate are very enlightening with respect to the central question. Feasible 
reforms are needed, and it is more effective to first ask which legacies need to be amended, and how. 
I will focus on three of these: the euro area divide legacy, the debt legacy and the fiscal time-
inconsistency legacy. I will argue that the first requires ‘experience-rated policies,’ which should break 
the deadlock on several existing proposals (e.g. EDIS and EUIS), and that the other two are better 
addressed with institutional developments – in particular, by transforming the European Stability 
Mechanism into a fully fledged European Stability Fund – rather than with simple revisions and 
simplifications of the existing fiscal rules and surveillance procedures. Furthermore, the ESF can also 
help to gain resilience by addressing two important structural deficits of the EU: the lack of a risk-
sharing (and stabilization) mechanism, and the need for euro area safe assets. Some current steps go in 
this direction but, other than short-sighted politics and misunderstandings, there is no reason for not 
setting a more ambitious feasible course, such as the one proposed here. 
Three legacies and their lessons 
The legacies can be summarized in a few graphs and tables:  
1. The euro area divide legacy: the euro area is more unequal now than when it started, as is shown 
in Figures 1 and 2, where the euro area is divided between GIPS (Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) and non-GIPS. Table 1 also shows the poor performance of Italy since the start of the 
euro. 
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2. The debt legacy is an Achilles heel in spite of the ESM handling of the euro crisis. As Table 2 
shows, the low growth of Greece, Italy and Portugal has also resulted in levels of sovereign debt 
over 100% of GDP.  
  
Greece 3.8
Italy -1.1
Portugal 10.7
Spain 18.8
GIPS 6.5
Germany 25.0
France 14.3
Non-GIPS 23.9
Table	1. Accumulated	Per	Capita	Growth
(2000	– 2018)	
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3. The fiscal time-inconsistency legacy: many euro area countries – particularly, but not only, GIPS 
– have followed pro-cyclical fiscal policies. Table 3 shows country correlations between 
surpluses and outputs, which should be positive to help to stabilize the economy (i.e. save in 
good times for bad times). 3a shows the current account country surplus and 3b the government 
primary surplus (i.e. a measure of counter-cyclical fiscal policies). The contrast between 
Germany and France should be noted.  
 
We can extrapolate the corresponding lessons from these facts: 
1. Policy and institutional designs must take into account that heterogeneity among euro area countries 
is not a transitional phenomenon and, therefore, unless a policy is designed to achieve convergence 
(e.g. structural funds) it must be well designed to avoid undesired transfers; ‘experience-rating’ 
should be part of this design. 
2. GIPS, and not only GIPS, countries have a very limited capacity to absorb a negative shock without 
increasing their debt levels to problematic – high spread – levels; therefore, debt reduction is 
important, as is also having a better capacity to absorb shocks and share risks in the euro area. The 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has played an important role as a crisis resolution 
mechanism, but this is not enough. It should be further developed. 
3. While the ECB has solved the problem of time-inconsistency of monetary policy (e.g. running 
competitive devaluations), there is no similar solution for the time-inconsistency of fiscal policy – 
in particular, there is a lack of sufficient savings (or debt reductions) in good times. A stabilization 
mechanism is missing. Neither the ESM nor the Stability and Growth Pact rules play this role. A 
European Stability Fund can design its contracts to guarantee that the participating countries follow 
stabilization policies, at least in policies where the ESF intervenes. 
Setting ‘experience-rated policies’ 
There is a recurrent idea in the history of the European Union (and of the EMU). The idea: the idea that 
its development will bring convergence among member countries, making it easier to advance further 
with common policies, that is, the idea of ‘the EU as a self-converging process.’ From this perspective, 
one can conclude that the first twenty years of the euro have shown EMU to be a failure. However, ‘the 
idea’ is in itself a wrong premise: convergence is desirable, even if it has not happened in historical 
unions such as the US, but EMU policies and institutions should, and can, be designed to encompass 
countries which are heterogeneous in many dimensions (growth paths, income levels, domestic policies, 
debt liabilities, country risks, languages and local cultures etc.). Otherwise, not all countries can benefit 
and new exits cannot be prevented. However, there can also be a wrong conclusion to this premise: 
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avoid common policies which may result in undesired persistent transfers across member countries. A 
variant of this is not much better: postpone these policies until convergence is achieved. 
This seems to be the fate of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), of a possible European 
Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS) and of a risk-sharing shock-absorbing mechanism. For 
example, the Five Presidents’ Report (2015) supported the latter but proposed to postpone its 
implementation to the stage where ‘convergence has been achieved.’ Similarly, Eurogroup detractors of 
implementing EDIS to complete the Banking Union now set risk-reduction as a pre-condition. However, 
these positions ignore a basic design that insurance companies systematically apply: contracts with 
different risk-premia, i.e. ‘experience-rated policies.’ Ignorance, misunderstanding or mistrust? 
For example, the European Banking Union has the information, the risk-assessment technology and 
drafted rules1 to implement in a relatively short period of time a common EU deposit insurance – say, 
for the first €100,000 – financed by the Union’s banks with differential bank-country premia in order to 
prevent undesired cross-country permanent transfers. It is difficult to rationalise the current deadlock, 
and even more so when the Italians now, as the Greeks did then, are running down their deposits. With 
an ‘experience-rated EDIS,’ banks operating in Italy or Greece would pay – or commit to pay – more, 
but deposits in euros would be equally safe across the euro area. The EDIS could be implemented with 
direct transfers through the Banking Union interbank market, but a more robust design would be to have 
a fund collecting banks’ insurance dues and providing the deposit insurance. That is, an EDIS similar to 
the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which is “a risk-based deposit insurance 
assessment system,”2 but in which, at least temporarily, the ‘risk-based’ part should have a country 
component3 and, as in the case of the US, countries should be able to complement the insurance provided 
by the EDIS. 
Similarly, the main current proposals for the establishment of a European Unemployment Insurance 
System – e.g. Árpád, Brogueira et al. (2018), Beblavy and Lenaerts (2017), Dolls et al. (2018) and 
Dullien, Weizsäcker et al. (2018) – introduce restrictions in order to avoid, or minimize, permanent 
transfers. In particular, Árpád, Brogueira et al. (2018; the only EUIS dynamic general equilibrium 
structural model) propose an explicit ‘experience-rated system’ and show that, while an EUIS only for 
extreme events – i.e. a ‘rainy day fund’ – would provide limited welfare gains, there can be unanimous 
agreement among EA countries about modifying their current unemployment benefit (UB) systems to a 
common minimal EA system – with a 10% replacement rate and unlimited duration (conditional on 
being actively searching), which can be complemented by countries preferring higher replacement rates 
(e.g. France).4 Differential payroll taxes to cover the minimal EUIS can prevent permanent transfers. 
Furthermore, country tax rates can be stable, providing insurance across the EA. However, stable tax 
rates and employment/unemployment fluctuations result in fluctuating funds at the national level. A 
centralized EA fund can smooth these fluctuations; in fact, if the fund has (highly rated) access to 
international financial markets, national tax rates can be constant, within a risk-assessment period. 
                                                     
1 “EBA guidelines on methods for calculating contributions to deposit guarantee schemes” (2015), 
https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1089322/EBA-GL-2015-
10_GL+on+Calculation+of+Contributions+DGS.pdf/92da0adb-3e16-480f-8720-94f744ea7a44. 
2 See https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/insurance.html. 
3 For example, in June 2017 depositors in the Spanish Banco Popular “were said to be withdrawing €2bn a day” (The 
Economist, June 10th 2017). If it had not been bought by Banco de Santander (a very international but nevertheless Spanish 
bank) this would have meant a significant loss to the Spanish Deposit Guarantee Fund. In contrast, in the same month, the 
failing Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza only found an Italian buyer, Intesa Sanpaolo, for their ‘good assets’ 
and, circumventing the new ECB Banking Union rules, the Italian government provided loan guarantees for €12bn. In sum, 
the Italian risk is higher than the Spanish one, but this must be priced, not EDIS-denied. 
4 Árpád, Brogueira et al. (2018) show that the present value welfare gains in consumption equivalent values (CEV) of 
introducing this reform are substantial and that, with complementary replacement rates, support for the reform is unanimous 
across countries and within countries (i.e. among the employed, unemployed and inactive) in the calibrated economy. 
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The two previous mechanisms, EDIS and EUIS, have five properties in common: i) they are ‘country 
experience-rated’; ii) their sources of revenue (bank fees and payroll taxes) and expenditures (deposits 
and unemployment benefits) are well defined; iii) they do not have country eligibility criteria (e.g. a 
high unemployment risk country may have a high EUIS payroll tax but is not excluded); iv) they can 
operate better with a common fund; and v) while they are described as euro area systems, they can also 
be EU systems or even systems for a subset of EU countries.  
It must be noted that ‘experience-rated taxes’ provide a strong incentive to reduce risks: once a 
system is in place, tax differentials become themselves the best indicators of country risk differentials, 
and of the value of risk-reduction improvements. However, one may argue that once insurance is 
provided – say, with an EDIS – there is less ‘market discipline’ and more moral hazard, but this is also 
true of car accidents: without car insurance car accidents would certainly provide plenty of ‘market 
discipline.’ 
I am not proposing that all the EA policies should be ‘experience-rated,’ but that it is a much better 
solution – which, properly designed, can have unanimous support – than not to have these European 
policies for reasons of fear, or mistrust, that they will become undesired redistributional policies.5 The 
above five properties define a basic robust design consistent with any view that favours strengthening 
Europe. 
Ex-ante vs ex-post conditionality and fiscal rules 
While ‘experience-rated’ policies do not seem to be well understood, or politically accepted, by EU 
policy-makers, ‘conditionality’ is now a commonly accepted feature. For example, the ESM Treaty 
requires members to “provide support under strict conditionality” (Art. 3). However, as in the case of 
the ESM, conditionality is usually ex-ante conditionality, as eligibility criteria.6 In contrast, ‘experience-
rated’ policies have their own ex-post conditionality: if in a new risk assessment the risk profile has 
changed, then premiums and/or taxes change.  
I am not arguing that ex-ante conditionality cannot provide fiscal discipline (it did so for many 
countries before they were able to adopt the euro), but instead that it may not be the most efficient way 
to provide it. It has three limitations: i) it may result in unnecessary exclusions, as in the case of 
excluding high-unemployment countries from the EUIS; ii) by nature it is an asymmetric conditionality: 
eligibility conditions are minimal conditions which are usually binding in bad times but mute in good 
times; and iii) just imposing the conditionality in bad times – for example, with austerity measures – 
may be unnecessarily harsh (which can also make the conditionality non-credible). 
Fiscal rules have similar limitations, in particular, (ii) and (iii). For example, the Stability and Growth 
Pact rules have become increasingly more conditional, to the point of ‘excess complexity.’7 
Nevertheless, beyond peer-pressure – through the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), etc. – the set of 
instruments in the hands of the European Commission is very limited and asymmetric: ‘sticks,’ with 
limited credibility, without ‘carrots’ (I come back to this point below). 
                                                     
5 For example, Adam Tooze remarks “If it had wished to maximize pressure on Europe’s governments to preserve fiscal 
discipline, the ECB could have adopted a discriminatory system of national specific repo haircuts, imposing tougher 
conditions on less credible peripherical eurozone borrowers” (2018, p.100). One can see the interest of such a policy as 
well as the reasons why the ECB may ‘not have wished’ to implement this policy. 
6 The Maastricht criteria for entering the EA are another example of ex-ante conditionality. 
7 For example, the “required annual structural adjustments to the mid-term objectives (MTO)” conditions in the state of the 
economy (output gap) and the level of debt (> or 60%), with further flexibility clauses subject to “eligibility conditions,” 
but without checks ex post; for more details, see the European Fiscal Board Annual Report 2018. The report also remarks 
on the lack of ex post checks on eligibility criteria and calls for a simplification of the SGP rules. 
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There is an increasing consensus that both the current SGP rules and surveillance system need to be 
simplified and, in particular, that there is a need “to clearly separate the role of the assessor from that of 
the decision maker(s).”8 Both changes would be most welcome. Nevertheless, the idea persists that 
further steps – for example, in risk-sharing – should have compliance with the fiscal rules as eligibility 
criteria without ex post conditionality. In sum, even in this improved design it seems that the capacity 
of the EA to foster counter-cyclical fiscal policies among very different countries would still be very 
limited, while it is possible to do better. 
Rethinking ESM and existing EU sovereign debt contracts in three steps 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has played a major role in the resolution of the euro crisis, 
in particular by providing very long-term credit at relatively low interest rates, after having done the 
corresponding risk-assessment to guarantee the sustainability of its contracts (see Corsetti et al. 2017). 
For example, it holds more than a third of the Greek debt with durations of thirty years and more. In a 
sense, it has transformed what would have been defaultable (risky) debt into long-term safer debt. Like 
all European sovereign debt, it is non-contingent debt. Nevertheless, it certainly can be expected that 
Greece will go through relatively good and bad times in the next three decades, and rolling over all this 
debt at the end may be problematic, to say the least. The long-term debt could be transformed into a 
state-contingent long-term contract, with larger repayments in good times and smaller, or negative (i.e. 
providing additional credit to Greece), repayments in bad times. The contract can be designed as a 
‘constrained-efficient contract.’9 This would be a better contract for Greece, guaranteeing that at least a 
third of its debt is managed as a ‘stabilization policy.’ 
What can be done with existing EU sovereign debt held by the ESM can also be done with – at least 
part of – the ‘legacy debt’ in the euro area and this would be a second, and major, step. The case of the 
Italian debt is paradigmatic. One can argue that the Italian sovereign debt crisis of autumn 2018, with 
its spread peak of 333 points over the German Bund on 18 October and its final resolution two months 
later, when on 19 December the European Commission accepted the Italian budget revision with a 
reduction of the deficit from 2.4% of GDP to 2%, is possibly the best example of how ‘market 
discipline,’ together with the new rules which allow the European Commission to request a budget 
revision with the threat of a fine if there is no compliance, work, even in confronting a populist 
government elected with a promise to challenge the EC and approve an expansionary budget.  
There are, however, worrisome aspects of this ‘successful event.’ First, there would have been even 
more ‘market discipline’ if the populist government had had control of its currency (the Italian lira, 
which the same leaders had nostalgically praised in the past), but to what avail? Second, while the 
Italians were protected from a currency crisis by the ECB, they were not protected from a (mini) 
sovereign debt crisis and with two thirds of it in their hands – was this really necessary? Third, given 
Macron’s concessions to the yellow jackets movement, the game of ‘chicken’ between the EC and the 
Italian government could have continued, in which case would the EC have gone ahead and sanctioned 
Italy? Fourth, without intermediate institutions to deal with a (mini) sovereign debt crisis, the process 
became highly political. Last but not least, what really counts is the final outcome, over which the EC 
has no control. It is still too early to judge, but there was no rigorous revision of the budget and, 
unfortunately, the expansionary budget may actually be counter-cyclical since, for example, according 
to the Italian statistical office ISTAT, industrial production decreased by 2.6% in 2018, a year of 
                                                     
8 European Fiscal Board (2018 p. 70). A similar recommendation is given in Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018). 
9 ‘Constrained-efficient’ means that the contract maximizes welfare, taking into account that: the sovereign country can 
always break the contract (losing access to the ESF and, possibly, to other EMU benefits); the ESF cannot ex-post incur 
expected losses with the contract (i.e. there are no ex-ante or ex-post persistent transfers to borrowers); and the contract, 
with its risk-assessment revisions, provides incentives to borrowers to reduce their country risks and, possibly, debt levels 
(see Árpád, Carceles-Poveda et al. 2018).  
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recovery for the euro area, so what will the EC do if in the end the deficit is worse than the deficit 
foreseen in the ‘approved budget’? 
Suppose, for a moment, that the negotiation process between the EC and the Italian government had 
been similar (which doesn’t have to be the case), but instead of rejecting the budget the commission’s 
vice-president, Valdis Dombrovski, had said to the Italian prime minister, Giuseppe Conte “We think 
that with your budget, and your claim that with it the country will grow, you are putting your country at 
risk and, in particular, your large stock of debt. We want to help but if you want to go ahead, an agreed 
fraction of your debt – say, a third, as for Greece – will need to be managed by the ESM under a new 
long-term state-contingent contract, similar to the Greek one but adjusted to your growth and risk profile 
(under this scenario, Greece would already have a new contract). It will follow stabilization principles 
but it will also take into account your overall sovereign debt (e.g. it will be more generous if the non-
ESM sovereign debt is reduced). Repayments on the sovereign debt held by the ESM will take priority 
over the remaining government obligations (this would be the main, and possibly unique, element of the 
future national budget reviews by the EC, with violations subject to penalties, as in any insurance 
contract). In any case, we need to isolate the banking system from your sovereign debt risks and, 
therefore, the rest of your sovereign debt will no longer be considered safe by the ECB unless it proves 
to be safe. This means that if you don’t want to take this opportunity, and you do go ahead with your 
proposed budget, 100% of your debt will not be considered safe by the ECB.”  
This ‘counterfactual’ negotiation procedure does not solve Italy’s stagnation problem but it does on 
the one hand provide support and give more ownership to the Italian government; on the other hand, it 
has a more effective and credible mix of ‘carrots and sticks.’10 This takes us to what can be a third stage 
in transforming the ESM into a European Stability Fund. By offering risk-based long-term state-
contingent constrained-efficient contracts,11 the ESF, while avoiding persistent transfers across 
countries, can: provide risk-sharing regarding risks which are not perfectly correlated within the euro 
area; have a better capacity to borrow and lend in the international markets than national governments 
when risks have an impact in the euro area; and absorb an important fraction of the existing sovereign 
debt, effectively transforming risky non-contingent sovereign debt into a riskless contract. In particular, 
once the ESF is allowed to offer these contracts to countries which are not in a situation of crisis, it 
should be in their interest to transform part of their existing sovereign debt into ESF contracts, an 
efficient way to deal with the ‘debt overhang’ problem. 
An immediate consequence of increasing the scope of operation of the ESF would be the expansion 
of its balance sheet with safe assets (i.e. designed to be ‘as safe as they can possibly be’), and therefore 
it would be in a position to offer highly rated bonds to the international capital market and, given that 
the issuer would be the ESF and not any given country, they could be called ‘eurobonds’ – as safe, if 
not safer, than US debt – enhancing the international standing of the European Union. 
These are non-trivial reforms leading to a stronger institutional framework for the euro area, and the 
EU without a need to enlarge the EU or EA budgets or to strengthen the European Commission’s 
scrutiny of domestic affairs (in fact, the contrary), reforms that, analysed without prejudice, are immune 
to most ideological debates and, therefore, unless the views are short-sighted, they are apt to have 
political support. They are reforms that address the debt and fiscal time-inconsistency legacy problems 
and can be implemented even in a divided euro area. In fact, even if they are designed to avoid undesired 
cross-country transfers, the lagging countries within the union are the ones that can benefit the most and, 
therefore, the reforms also address the euro area divide legacy problem. 
                                                     
10 Obviously, the ESM would have to do a fair amount of contract and debt management engineering to back-up the 
commissioner’s claim. More importantly, the ESM (or better to call it the ESF) would be an intermediate institution, in the 
same way the ECB is. In other words, it should not be that the vice-president of the Commission gives orders to the ECB 
or the ESM, but that the above claim reflects an agreed (new) framework where the ECB and the ESM act accordingly in 
a situation of (mini) crisis. 
11 See footnote 9. 
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